An Encroaching Exercise in State Taxation: Orvis Company v. Tax Appeals Tribunal by Williams, Michael J.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 5
Fall 1996
An Encroaching Exercise in State Taxation: Orvis
Company v. Tax Appeals Tribunal
Michael J. Williams
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger
Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Michael J. (1996) "An Encroaching Exercise in State Taxation: Orvis Company v. Tax Appeals Tribunal," Roger Williams
University Law Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol2/iss1/5
Expansion, Compression and Relief:
An Analysis of the Jury's Role in
Patent Infringement Cases
Employing the Doctrine of
Equivalents
INTRODUCTION
Issued by the Patent and Trademark Office,1 a patent is a
grant of a right to exclude others for a period of twenty years from
making, selling, or using an invention.2 Patent infringement oc-
curs whenever one lacking authority makes, uses or sells a pat-
ented invention within the United States during the life of the
patent. 3 Determining when an invention has in fact infringed on a
patent has proved to be a rather formidable task for the courts. 4
Historically, two different forms of infringement have emerged: lit-
eral infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Literal infringement is established only if each and
every one of the elements of the alleged infringing invention is ex-
actly the same as those of the patented device.5 In contrast, in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents occurs when two
devices perform "substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to obtain substantially the same result."6 The cru-
1. This office is a federal agency existing under the auspices and control of
the Department of Commerce and headed by the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1988).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988 & Supp. I 1995).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
4. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728); Brian E. Lewis,
Expanding the Use of Hypothetical Analysis When Evaluating Patent Infringement
Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1409 (1993).
5. Rudolph P. Hofinann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of
Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 Win. Mitchell L.
Rev. 1033, 1034 (1994).
6. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
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cial determination of whether or not infringement has occurred
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents is often made
by a jury. In order for a jury to do this, a two step process is usu-
ally employed. The first step is to determine the meaning and
scope of the patent, and the second step is to compare the properly
construed claims to the device accused of infringing.7 Juries are
compelled to make these determinations when a litigant asserts
her constitutional rights.
The Seventh Amendment provides that in suits "where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved... ."8 This right to a jury trial has long
been established in patent cases including those involving the doc-
trine of equivalents. 9 But the proper role of the jury in patent in-
fringement litigation involving the doctrine of equivalents has
been a focal point of confusing and mixed signals from the Federal
Circuit. 10 One area in particular is after a jury verdict has been
rendered. Approximately one year after its inception, the Federal
Circuit decided Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 where a jury
7. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
8. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
9. See Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189 (1881). Most patent infringement
cases are initially brought in United States District Courts by virtue of their sub-
ject matter and complexity. Litigants seeking to appeal decisions of the district
courts generally have one course to follow. This arises because currently only one
federal appeals court hears patent infringement cases from all of the district
courts.
10. Created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has exclusive jurisdiction of ap-
peals relating to, among other topical areas, all patent cases. Pub. L. No. 97-164,
126, 96 Stat. 25, 37; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988). In practice, the Federal Circuit is
actually the court of last resort for most patent litigants since the United States
Supreme Court does not usually grant certiorari to patent cases. Hofinann, supra
note 5, at 1038. But see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) and Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed.Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S.
Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728) which both were granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court and are discussed in Part III. Thus, the decisions of this tribunal are regu-
larly watched with interest. See, e.g., McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (jury found patent valid but not infringed upon); Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(noninfringement of patent found by jury); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946
F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (summary judgment granted due to noninfringement);
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (verdict of infringement
found by jury but overturned due to insufficient evidence).
11. 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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verdict was reversed on a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JMOL). 12 Although not an equivalents case, Connell
helps demonstrate the Federal Circuit's power with regard to re-
versing jury verdicts. After a seven day trial, the jury returned a
verdict claiming that the patent at issue was valid and that the
defendant's invention infringed. 13 Pursuant to Rule 50,14 the court
later entered a final judgment reversing the jury's finding of valid-
ity, and stating that as a matter of law there was no infringe-
ment.15 Last year, the Federal Circuit decided two important
patent cases, one involving the doctrine of equivalents in particu-
lar,16 and the other involving patent infringement in general. 17
Both of these cases have continued the uncertainty of the jury's
proper role in cases decided under the doctrine of equivalents.
This Comment analyzes the current role of the jury in patent
infringement cases under the doctrine of equivalents and proposes
a solution to enhance that role. Part I provides background on the
doctrine of equivalents including its purpose in the law of patents
and also provides the modern test under the doctrine. Part II ex-
amines the jury's role in selected Supreme Court cases that pre-
date the creation of the Federal Circuit. Part III traces key
decisions of the Federal Circuit handed down since its inception
fourteen years ago, and concentrates on the compression and ex-
pansion of the jury's role. Additionally, Part III compares and con-
trasts Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,18 and Hilton Davis
12. Since this case was decided, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now col-
lectively refer to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alternative motions for a
new trial, and conditional rulings for directed verdicts as judgments as a matter of
law (JMOL). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
13. Connell, 722 F.2d at 1545.
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 states, in part: "If during a trial by jury a party has been
fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the
issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the control-
ling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable motion on that issue." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(a).
15. Connell, 722 F.2d at 1545.
16. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728).
17. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
18. Id.
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Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 19 two of the most recent
decisions of the Federal Circuit, and then examines Markman
which was reviewed by the Supreme Court in April of 1996. Fi-
nally, Part IV of this Comment concludes with a proposed statu-
tory framework which would help both jurors and judges decide
cases involving the doctrine of equivalents.
PART I. THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Merely to change the form of a machine is the work of a con-
structor, not of an inventor; such a change cannot be deemed
an invention .... [Only after one]... change[s] the form of an
existing machine, and by means of such change . .. intro-
duce[s] and employ[s] other mechanical principles or natural
powers, or as it is termed, a new mode of operation, [to] thus
attain a new and useful result, is the [creation then thus the]
subject of a patent.20
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Curtis first alluded
to the doctrine of equivalents in the 1853 case of Winans v. Den-
mead.21 At issue was a patent for the design of an iron railroad car
used for the transportation of coal and containing, among other
things, a cylindrical upper part; a frustrum of a cone at the bottom;
and a flange attached to the underside which was connected to a
movable bottom. 22 The patent holder claimed that the defendant's
creation of an iron railroad car mirrored his in all respects except
in shape: defendant's cars were octagonal and pyramidal, and
plaintiff's cars were cylindrical and conical. 23 The United States
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland entered judgment for the
defendant claiming that there was no infringement of the plain-
tiffs patent. 24 The Supreme Court reversed this decision stating
that the lower court improperly removed the question of infringe-
ment from the jury.25 Specifically, the Court held that whether or
not a defendant's accused device infringes on the letters-patent by
embodying the patentee's mode of operation to obtain an analogous
19. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb.
26, 1996) (No. 95-728).
20. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 341 (1853).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 330.
23. Id. at 332.
24. Id. at 338.
25. Id. at 344.
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result is a question for the jury.26 Aside from being the Court's
first discussion of the doctrine of equivalents, the holding in Wi-
nans pronounced the prominent role of juries sitting on infringe-
ment cases.
After Winans, the Supreme Court has decided relatively few
cases involving the doctrine of equivalents.27 Within these opin-
ions, no well-defined test for infringement has been stated by the
Court. As a result, one historically accepted way for determining
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was to look to
whether or not the elements of a device, when placed in combina-
tion, were "substantially different" or "mere formal alterations."2s
Another accepted way of determining equivalents infringement
was to compare the challenged invention to the original one to see
if the former was a "close copy" of the latter.29 But it would be
almost a century after Winans first alluded to the doctrine of
equivalents until a well-defined test for infringement under this
doctrine would be stated clearly by the Court.
The modern test for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents was set forth by the Court in the 1950 case of Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 30 This case
involved a patent on fluxes and an electric welding process where
the trial court, affirmed in part by the court of appeals, 31 declared
the patent valid and infringed. 32 The Supreme Court affirmed
both the district court and the court of appeals, on the issues of
validity and infringement, and echoed the language of Winans
that, "a finding of equivalence is a determination of fact" within the
26. Id.
27. See infra note 40.
28. Any improvements which were "substantially different" from the original
combination of two or more ingredients within a machine were not deemed to be
infringing under the doctrine of equivalents. In contrast, a "mere formal altera-
tion" of the ingredients would give rise to an infringement claim under the doctrine
of equivalents. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 556 (1870). This dis-
tinction could be viewed as a precursor to the modern "function/way/result" test.
For a description of the modern test, see infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
29. Ives v. Hamilton, 92 U.S. 426, 431 (1875). It should be noted that this pre-
modern test was basically the same as that set forth in Seymour v. Osborne, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1870). A "close copy" is simply something that is, "the same, or
substantially the same, combination of mechanical devices." Ives, 92 U.S. at 430-
31.
30. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
31. Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 167 F.2d 531, 539 (1948).
32. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 606.
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realm of the jury.33 The Court went on to define the modern test
stating that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents occurs
when one produces a device that "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same re-
sult."3 4 This is more commonly referred to in cases as the "func-
tion/way/result" test.35 In Graver Tank, the Court later modified
"to obtain the same result" by adding the word "substantially."3 6
Therefore, the full function/way/result test is that a device will be
deemed to be infringing under the doctrine of equivalents if it "per-
forms substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain substantially the same result."37 The theory is that
two devices satisfying the function/way/result test are the same
even though they may differ in name, form or shape. 38 Supporting
this theory is that without the doctrine of equivalents, the patent
would become a "hollow and useless thing."39 Since the litigants
have already written the patent itself, thereby giving the invention
form, it is imperative that juries understand their proper role to
help give the patent meaning.
PART II. THE HISTORIC ROLE OF THE JURY IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES
Through the years, the Supreme Court has remained rela-
tively quiet in deciding cases involving the doctrine of
33. Id. at 609-10.
34. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)) (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Lifescan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 76 F.3d 358 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Genentech, Inc. v. Welcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Zenith Cabs, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Conroy v. Reebok Intl, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
36. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Court echoed concerns of prior tribunals by stating that there would
be room and encouragement for "the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant
and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding
nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence
outside the reach of law." Id. at 607. The "law" here refers to literal infringement.
The Court stated that "[i]f accused matter falls clearly within the claim, infringe-
ment is made out and that is the end of it." Id. For a discussion of literal infringe-
ment, see Hofmann, supra note 5, at 1038.
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equivalents. 40 Even smaller is the number of cases after Winans
which made it to the Court on a question of a jury verdict.41 As
illustrated below, most of these cases reached the Court on a ques-
tion of whether proper instructions were given to the jury by the
trial judge. It is these few cases that have helped provide the foun-
dation of the modern jury role in patent cases.
The first case which illustrates the historic role of juries in
patent cases is Prouty v. Draper Ruggles.42 In Prouty, the patentee
invented a plough on which a patent was secured and allegedly
infringed by the defendant under the doctrine of equivalents. 43
The plaintiff presented an extensive description of the plough
which was uncontested by the defendant. 44 The issue before the
Court was the validity of a jury instruction given by the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. 45 In-
stead of disregarding the jury's conclusion, the Court held that the
jury instruction delivered was not in error, and that therefore, the
judgment must be affirmed. 46 Specifically, the plaintiff offered evi-
dence and also moved for the court to instruct the jury,
that if the defendants have used, in combination with the
other two parts, a standard of the description set forth in the
specification ... such use was an infringement of the plain-
tiffs claim in that particular .... Also that if any two of the
three parts described, as comprising the construction claimed
in the specification, had been used in combination by the de-
40. For instance, in addition to Graver Tank, the Court has decided a total of
thirteen cases involving this doctrine since the start of the twentieth century. See
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996); Exhibit Supply
Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211 (1940); Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc., 282 U.S.
784 (1931); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429 (1926); Westing-
house Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Installation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924); Hildreth v.
Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27 (1921); Weber Elec. Co. v. E. H. Freeman Elec. Co., 256 U.S.
668 (1921); Brothers v. United States, 250 U.S. 88 (1919); Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
v. Baldwin, 245 U.S. 198 (1917); Saint Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 311
(1917); Brill v. Washington Railway & Elec. Co., 215 U.S. 527 (1910); Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908); Hobbs v. Beach, 180
U.S. 383 (1901).
41. See Clough v. Barker, 106 U.S. 166 (1882); Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 327 (1868); Prouty v. Draper Ruggles, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (1842).
42. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (1842).
43. Id. at 339.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 336.
46. Id. at 341.
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fendants, it was an infringement of the patent, although the
third had not been used with them.47
In contrast, the defendant offered no evidence and did not propose
any instructions.48 The district court judge disregarded the plain-
tiffs instruction and delivered his own which read, "unless it is
proved, that the whole combination [consisting of three things] is
substantially used in the defendant's [invention], it is not a viola-
tion of the plaintiffs patent . .. ."49 The plaintiffs proposed in-
struction basically told the jury what they were to decide, while the
judge's placed all the discretion into the hands of the jury. The
Supreme Court affirmed the court's ruling that any discretion
should rest with the jury and not the litigants. 50 This result em-
powered juries serving in cases involving the doctrine of
equivalents.
The role of the jury was expanded in Tyler v. Boston.5 1 The
plaintiff claimed to have discovered a new compound fluid sub-
stance that burns by mixing "mineral or earthy oils" 52 with "fusel
oil."53 This mixture was designed to burn in what are commonly
known as oil lamps. 54 The defendant's fluid was composed of
naphtha seventy-two parts "in bulk" and twenty-eight parts of fu-
sel oil to which experts claimed was the "substantial equivalent" of
the plaintiffs creation. 55 According to the Court, the trial court
correctly stated that, "whether one compound of given proportions
is substantially the same as another compound varying in the pro-
portions - whether they are substantially the same or substan-
tially different - is a question of fact and for the jury."5 6
Despite the expansion of the jury's role in these doctrine of
equivalents cases, there remains the possibility that the judge will
47. Id. at 339-40.
48. Id. at 339.
49. Id. at 340.
50. Id. at 341.
51. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327 (1868).
52. Specifically the plaintiff claimed the "mineral and earthy oils" to be either
one part kerosene or one part naphtha or crude petroleum. Id. at 328.
53. The plaintiff did not specify what the exact amount of fusel oil was in the
invention, claiming only "by measure crude fusel oil one part. .. 'the exact quantity
of fusel oil which is necessary to produce the most desirable compound must be
determined by experiment." Id.
54. Id. at 327.
55. Id. at 328.
56. Id. at 330-31.
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grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alterna-
tive, a motion for a new trial. For example, in Clough v. Barker,
57
one of the issues confronted by the court was a motion for a new
trial. In that infringement case, a jury listened to the plaintiff de-
scribe a patent dealing with the improvement of gas-burners. 58 On
the actual infringement issue, the jury was asked to decide
whether or not the plaintiff was the true creator of the gas-burners
and, in addition, whether or not the product created and sold by
the defendant was substantially equivalent to the plaintiff's gas-
burner.59 Both issues were decided by the jury in favor of the
plaintiff and the judge refused to grant a new trial since the verdict
was sustained by the evidence presented at trial.60
Thus, the possibility of a motion for a new trial or other proce-
dural devices not unique to patent law, combined with the recent
decisions of the Federal Circuit, has led to confusion and conflict-
ing results in recent doctrine of equivalents cases.
PART III. THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE JURY AS MOLDED BY THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has decided a
large number of cases involving the doctrine of equivalents. 61 On
one hand, the Federal Circuit has sought to limit the role of ju-
ries62 and on the other, it has sought to expand that role.63 An
57. 106 U.S. 166 (1882).
58. Id. at 167.
59. Id. at 168.
60. Id. at 173.
61. See, e.g., Lifescan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 76 F.3d 358 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Intel Corp.
v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991); London v.
Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Corning Glass Works v.
Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Spectra Corp. v. Lutz,
839 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
62. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (holding claim interpretation is a question of law for
the court to decide).
63. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728) (holding
that the determination of equivalence is a question of fact for the jury to decide).
1996]
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examination of some of the cases that have been decided since the
Federal Circuit's creation in 1982 will provide an understanding of
the modern role of the jury in patent infringement cases involving
the doctrine of equivalents.
With the exception of one early decision,6 4 the Federal Circuit
has preserved the historic role of the jury. For example, in Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,6 5 the court simply
restated that the normal functions of the jury are to apply the law
to the facts and to balance carefully the intent of the parties during
the trial.6 6 Likewise, in Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs,
Inc.,67 in referring to evidence offered during trial, the court stated
that assuming any ambiguities exist, another normal role of the
jury is to resolve them and make any legitimate inferences from
the facts necessary to reach their decision.68 And in United States
Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp.,69 the court claimed that it was
for the jury to determine witness credibility and the weight of testi-
mony. Finally, the Federal Circuit collected all of these viewpoints
in Allied Colloids, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.7o when it pro-
claimed: "Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions . "..."71
The late 1980s through the 1990s, however, brought a noticea-
ble shift in direction of the Federal Circuit with regard to the jury's
role. The first case illustrating this is Newell Companies, Inc. v.
Kenney Manufacturing Co.,72 decided in 1988. At issue was a pat-
ent held by the plaintiff, Newell Companies, Inc., on retractable
window shades which allow consumers to assemble them without
64. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Connell
brought an infringement suit against Sears alleging that certain hair curlers sold
by Sears infringed on a patent held by Connell. Id. at 1545. Sears counterclaimed
denying infringement and asked for a declaratory judgment that the patent held
by Connell was invalid. Id. Following a seven day trial, the jury found that Con-
nell's patent "was valid, enforceable, and infringed by the accused curlers." Id.
However, the verdict was overturned when the judge claimed that as a matter of
law, there was not substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id.
65. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 1364.
67. 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
68. Id. at 1572.
69. 861 F.2d 695, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
70. 64 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
71. Id. at 1575.
72. 864 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the use of tools. 73 After all the evidence was in, "both parties
moved for a directed verdict on which the district court reserved its
rulings... . "74 The case was submitted to a jury and it returned a
verdict stating that the patent at hand was not obvious, but that
the defendant did in fact infringe on it.75 The district court then
ruled on the dual pre-verdict motions; it denied the plaintiff's, but
granted the defendant's and overturned the jury's verdict. 76 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district
court stating that there was "no legal error" in holding that the
patent was obvious.77 The defendant stated four possible reasons
for upholding the jury's verdict, but the Federal Circuit did not
agree. 78 In particular, defendant asserted: first, that the trial
court narrowly construed the elements of the claim; second, after a
verdict was rendered, the defendant did not meet its tremendous
burden of proof; third, the trial court was required to draw the "'in-
ference' of obviousness in plaintiff's favor"; and fourth, there is a
legal presumption of jury findings "necessary to support the ver-
dict."79 In reaching its holding, the Federal Circuit rejected all
four of these arguments advanced by Newell, noting that by fully
considering all of the evidence, there was a clear and strong case of
an obvious patent.80 Thus, despite the prior continual expansion
of the jury's role, Newell represents a new era within the Federal
Circuit where much less deference is shown to the jury in
equivalents cases.
Further illustrating this modern shift in the jury's role is
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.81 Decided three years after
Newell, Malta specifically involved the doctrine of equivalents.
The patent holder and plaintiff, Mr. Jacob Malta, brought suit on
his patent for handbells (used to make music) consisting of a clap-
ping device which allowed the user to adjust the loudness of the
bells with ease.8 2 The jury found that one of the claims was in-
73. Id. at 759.
74. Id. at 761.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 769.
78. Id. at 767.
79. Id. at 767-68.
80. Id. at 769.
81. 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1321.
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fringed under the doctrine of equivalents and that the defendant
was not the equitable holder of the plaintiffs patent; as a result,
they awarded damages in the amount of $950,000 to the plaintiff.83
Citing the opinion of the Federal Circuit in Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Sealy Mattress Co.,84 the district court overturned the jury with a
JMOL claiming that the jury had insufficient evidence to satisfy
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.8 5 In affirming this
decision, the Federal Circuit stated that, the "function/way/result
test is an acceptable way of showing that the structure in an ac-
cused device is the 'substantial equivalent' of a [patented device],"
but proper "proof is necessary to... [establish this or else the jury
is simply]. . .'put to sea without guiding charts' and... [asked to
determine] . . . infringement from simply comparing the claimed
invention and the accused device 'as to overall similarity.'"8 6 Thus,
after showing deference to the jury early in its history, the Federal
Circuit continued its more recent practice of overturning jury ver-
dicts in infringements cases.
The most important case of the modern era is Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.8 7 This case stands as the best example
of the compression of the role of the jury in cases involving the
doctrine of equivalents.
The facts of Markman are rather straightforward. The plain-
tiff, Markman, was the patent-holder and owner of a dry-cleaning
business."8 In an effort to improve business, he created an "inven-
tory control system"89 whereby articles of clothing that were re-
ceived from customers were processed and could be accounted for
at all times. 90 This system allowed the plaintiff to reduce clothing
loss substantially, which lead to less customer dissatisfaction,
helped prevent internal employee theft, and lead to an overall in-
83. Id. at 1323.
84. 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
85. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1324.
86. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1425-26).
87. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
88. Id. at 971.
89. This system consisted of the following: 1) a data input device used to enter
descriptions of articles and identity of patron, 2) a data processor including mem-
ory operable to store and record the above information, and 3) a dot matrix printer
which is used to generate records including optically-detectable bar codes. Id. at
972.
90. Id. at 971.
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crease in net profits. 91 Westview, the defendant and alleged in-
fringer, produced a device consisting of "two separate pieces of
equipment"92 used for inventory monitoring.93 Following the same
strategy of the defendant in Newell, Westview moved for a JMOL
at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in chief, to which the judge
deferred ruling.94 After the charge from the judge, the jury re-
turned a verdict finding that the defendant's system infringed on
two of the claims. 95
After the announcement of the jury's verdict, the district court
granted the defendant's motion for a JMOL, proclaiming that
"claim construction was a matter of law for the court ... "96
Through the interpretation of the district judge, the defendant's
system was lacking in several important respects when compared
to the plaintiff's.97 On review, the Federal Circuit examined its
own previous decisions and determined that there are two lines of
authority: one holding that claim construction is a matter of law
and the other holding that claim construction has underlying fac-
tual inquiries that must be submitted to a jury.98 The court then
looked to the decisions handed down by the Supreme Court which
91. Id.
92. These were the DATAMARK (a stationary device containing a keyboard,
electronic display, processor, and a printer) and the DATASCAN (portable device
containing a microprocessor and an optical detector used to read bar codes). Id. at
972.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 973.
95. In this case, Markman, the holder of patent '054, sued for infringement
under three different claims: 1, 10, and 14. Independent claim 1 is entitled the
"Inventory Control and Reporting System." It is comprised of: a data input device,
a data processor, and a dot matrix printer. Dependent claim 10 refers to the input
device of claim 1 as being an "alpha-numeric keyboard." Independent claim 14 is
not described as it was not an issue in this appeal. The jury found that only in-
dependent claim 1 and dependent claim 10 were infringed upon. Id. at 972-73.
96. Id. at 973.
97. Contrary to the jury's perception that "inventory" referred simply to
"transaction totals or dollars," the trial court judge construed the word inventory
to mean "articles of clothing." On appeal, Chief Judge Archer of the Federal Circuit
specifically found that the Westview system could not: a) generate reports about
the status and location of articles, b) maintain an inventory total, and c) detect and
localize false additions or deletions to the inventory totals. Id.
98. Id. at 976-77 (citing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Intl Trade
Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983); McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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consistently followed the former construction.9 9 As a result, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. 100
A. Jury Process in the Wake of Markman
One major conflict that arises from a holding that claim con-
struction or interpretation is a matter of law for the court to de-
cide, is whether or not this infringes upon the Seventh
Amendment's right to a jury trial. This Seventh Amendment viola-
tion depends on the meaning of "claim construction or interpreta-
tion" as defined by the Federal Circuit. The Markman majority
defines this as the "meaning and scope of the patent" which is al-
legedly being infringed upon.1 1 The dissent, however, draws a
sharp distinction between "claim construction" and "claim inter-
pretation."10 2 Circuit Judge Newman states "patent infringement
litigation... often [involves]... a factual dispute as to the [true]
meaning and scope of technical terms or words of art as they are
used in... [a] ... patented invention." 10 3 In contrast, the majority
refuses to rely on any distinction between the two phrases. 10 4 In
his concurrence, Circuit Judge Mayer approaches the Seventh
Amendment conflict in a way similar to that of Circuit Judge New-
man. He begins by indicating that although interpretation of a
patent claim is usually a matter of law, certain scenarios do exist
where the patent claim will have underlying factual inquiries. 0 5
In these scenarios, Circuit Judge Mayer feels that the jury, and not
the judge, should resolve any factual inquiries. 10 6 In concluding,
Circuit Judge Mayer also refers to principles of contract law by re-
lying on the words of Justice Story and several decisions of the
99. Id. Chief Judge Archer listed a string of nine cases supporting this propo-
sition beginning with Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848), and end-
ing with Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265 (1904).
100. Markman, 52 F.3d at 989.
101. Id. at 975.
102. Circuit Judge Newman bases the thrust of her distinction between "claim
interpretation" and "claim construction" on principles of contract law. She high-
lights the battle as being "Legal 'Construction' v. Factual 'Interpretation." Id. at
1000 (Newman, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. The majority feels that claim construction and claim interpretation "mean
one and the same thing in patent law." Therefore, reference to principles of con-
tract law are unnecessary. Id. at 976.
105. Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring).
106. Id.
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Supreme Court.107 Judge Mayer goes on to note that although
Justice Story stated that "the interpretation of written documents
properly belongs to the court, . . . there certainly are cases, in
which.., the true interpretation of the language may be left to the
consideration of the jury for the purpose of carrying into effect the
real intention of the parties." 10 8 The precedent that Circuit Judge
Mayer relies on echoes Justice Story's words by holding that some
cases yield themselves to a determination by a jury. 10 9
In delivering the opinion of the Federal Circuit in Markman,
Chief Judge Archer states that the decision of the court must be
limited to the construction of claims."10 However, as detailed
above, two Federal Circuit judges"' and a number of commenta-
tors"1 2 disagree, stating that in practice, the holding will not be so
limited. This expanded view of the Markman holding arises be-
cause the issue of claim interpretation surfaces in nearly every in-
fringement suit, and it is often the issue on which the case is either
tried or disposed. 113
To date, the Federal Circuit has ruled generally that the issue
of infringement is a two step process: the first step is to construe
107. Id. at 997 (quoting William & James Brown & Co. v. McGran, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 479, 493 (1840)). In the quoted case, Justice Story stated, "the interpretation
of written documents properly belongs to the Court, and not to the jury." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 123 (1872); Reed v. Propri-
etors of Locks & Canals on Merrimac River, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 274, 289 (1850)). In
Goddard, the Court held that written instruments were to be determined by a
court "except when they contain technical words, or terms of art... in which case
the inference to be drawn from it must be left to the jury." Goddard, 84 U.S. at 142.
Similarly, in Reed, the Court allowed a jury to interpret a vague or ambiguous
deed where it was necessary to tell whether the land in controversy was within the
coverage of the deed. Reed, 49 U.S. at 289.
110. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
111. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Circuit Judge Mayer said that
this decision "eviscerates the role of the jury . . . mark[ing] a . . . change in the
course of patent law that is nothing short of bizarre" by indirectly stating that
"judges are any more qualified to resolve complex technical issues often present in
patent cases." Markman, 52 F.3d at 989-93 (Mayer, J., concurring). Likewise, in
her dissent, Circuit Judge Newman states that this decision "creates a litigation
system that is unique to patent cases, unworkable, and ultimately unjust."
Markman, 52 F.3d at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting).
112. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Matthew W. Siegal, Court Limits Jury's Role
In Patent Interpretation, Nat'l L. J., October 23, 1995, at C39-40.
113. Marcus Millet, Federal Circuit Strictly Limits Role of Juries in Patent
Cases, N.J.L.J., July 24, 1995, at 13.
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the asserted claims, and the second step is to determine whether
the accused device or method falls within the properly construed
claims. 114 This highlights the importance of the first step - which
Markman held is only for the trial court judge to construe. Prior to
Markman some cases had indicated that it was the job of the jury
to perform both of these functions. 115 Because of this tension be-
tween judge and jury, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict. 116
B. The Court's Review of Markman
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari
to patent cases involving the doctrine of equivalents. 117 However,
on April 23, 1996, Justice Souter handed down a unanimous opin-
ion of the Supreme Court in the Markman case."18 In affirming
the Federal Circuit, the Court held "that the construction of a pat-
ent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court."119 In reaching this decision, the Court
first looked to whether or not the construction of a patent
was tried at law at the time of the Founding [of the United
States] or is at least analogous to [a cause of action] that was.
If the action in question belongs in the law category, [then we
next] ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to
the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law
right as it existed in 1791 [at the Founding].1 20
The Court concluded that early patent infringement cases, and
even more so, modern infringement actions must be tried to a
jury.. 21 With the patent infringement fitting into the historical
law category, all that was left for the Court was to determine
whether or not construction of a patent must fall into the hands of
a jury in order to preserve the Constitutional right to a jury
114. Accord Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 1110 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prod., 840 F.2d 902, 908 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
115. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816. 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
116. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (Sep. 27, 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
117. See supra note 10.
118. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
119. Id. at 1387.
120. Id. at 1389 (citations omitted).
121. Id. See, e.g., Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. P.C. 168 (MB. 1789).
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trial.122 Unlike the first issue, there is no apparent determinative
law or test. As a result, the Court is "forced to make [its own] judg-
ment about the scope of the Seventh Amendment guarantee
.... -123 In reaching this judgment, the Court "searche[d] the Eng-
lish common law for 'appropriate analogies' rather than a 'precise
analogous common-law cause of action."1 24 The only analogy that
could be found by the Court was the construction of specifications
which described an invention. 125 The Court found that there was
"no established jury practice sufficient to support an argument by
analogy that today's construction of a claim should be a guaran-
teed jury issue."126
The Court's judgment on this issue rested primarily on the
jury's role in patent infringement cases. The Court stated that the
"absence of an established [jury] practice should not [be a] surprise
... given the primitive state of jury patent practice at the end of
the 18th century, when juries were still new to the field." 127 Dur-
ing this time, judges created the law without the aid of prece-
dents.128 For example, looking once again at the construction of
specifications, early English reports show "the judges [and not ju-
ries] construing the terms of the specifications." 129 Furthermore,
the jury's limited role is illustrated even in later cases decided by
this Court.' 30 Thus, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit.
By affirming the Federal Circuit, modern juries in doctrine of
equivalents infringement cases will now suffer a setback in terms
of the actual power they possess. As stated earlier, claim interpre-
tation is probably the single most important half of the two-part
122. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389-90.
123. Id. at 1389.
124. Id. at 1390 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1986)).
125. Id. at 1391. Litigation here was referred to as "'enablement' cases in
which juries were asked to determine whether the specification described the in-
vention well enough to allow members of the appropriate trade to reproduce it."
Arkwright v. Nightingale, Day. Pat. Cas. 37, 60 (C.P. 1785).
126. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1391.
127. Id.
128. Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present, 13
L.Q. Rev. 313, 318 (1897).
129. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1392 (citing Bovill v. Moore, Dav. Pat. Cas. 361,
399, 404 (C.P. 1816) (judge submits question of novelty to the jury only after ex-
plaining some of the language and 'stat[ing] in what terms the specification runs')).
130. See, e.g., Winans v. New York & Erie R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 100
(1859); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854); Hogg v. Emerson,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 484 (1848).
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infringement analysis. With this issue completely beyond the
jury's reach, the jury's overall role in an infringement case is sig-
nificantly minimized. However, despite this setback, it appears
that there will be four positive effects.
First, the overall time spent on equivalents infringement cases
will be reduced.131 This will occur since claim determination is one
of the highly contested areas of a patent infringement case, and it
takes place at the outset. With the judge making a decision on
this, attorneys will probably feel that they have to do far less ex-
plaining to jurors. And, in a way, this result will actually have a
positive effect on the jury since their time spent in open court will
be reduced.
Second, the costs of equivalents infringement cases will be
sharply reduced. 132 Ordinarily, due to the complex nature of an
equivalents case, lawyers must devote a substantial amount of
time explaining the two patents at issue to the jury. This usually
involves highly trained expert witnesses who charge a high pre-
mium for their testimony. Since Markman held that claim inter-
pretation is for the court to decide, equivalents lawyers will no
longer need to explain what the patents mean. As a result, all of
the costs associated with time consuming testimony will be
eliminated.
Third, the Markman affirmation will protect defendants
against outrageous claims of patent infringement. 33 Judges will
have better expertise in infringement issues, and they will recog-
nize a plaintiff's faulty claim at the outset. Once identified, the
faulty claim will be dismissed before much time and energy is ex-
hausted on it. As a result, this has a positive effect on the jury's
role by not subjecting it to so-called frivolous litigation. The Court
arrives at this conclusion by examining its own precedent, particu-
larly that of Justice Curtis, a former patent practitioner, and by
examining functional considerations.1 3 4 Justice Curtis stated that
within the two basic elements of a patent case, which are, "constru-
ing the patent and determining whether infringement occurred,"
judges usually decide the former as a question of law and leave the
131. Rosenthal & Siegal, supra note 112, at C39.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1996).
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latter for juries to decide. 13 5 Functionally, the Court goes on to
say:
The construction of written instruments is one of those things
that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors
unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent construction in
particular "is a special occupation, requiring... special train-
ing and practice. [As a result,] [t]he judge ... is more likely to
give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury;
and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing
such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be." 136
Finally, the Markman decision promotes a new uniform treat-
ment of specific patents.137 Once again, the Court is supported by
precedent, noting that the limits of a patent must be public knowl-
edge.1 3 8 Without this knowledge, a "zone of uncertainty" would ex-
ist regarding the nature of a patent and, in turn, would make fewer
people decide to become inventors. 139 In fact, Congress also sought
uniformity of treatment for specific patents by creating the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: the exclusive tribunal for appel-
late patent decisions.140 With an exclusive patent tribunal, prece-
dent will develop over time and the public will not be subjected to
the whimsical will of one jury versus that of the next. Each future
jury will benefit from this precedent because it will become the law
judges will use to instruct juries.
C. The New Hope for Restoration of Juror Power: The
Hilton Decision
Before the Supreme Court even had a chance to render its de-
cision in Markman, the Federal Circuit was again confronted with
an important equivalents case. Not four months after the Federal
Circuit decided Markman, this same court shocked the intellectual
135. Id. (citing Hogg, 47 U.S. at 484; Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. at 338; Wi-
nans v. New York & Erie R. Co., 62 U.S. at 100).
136. Id. at 1395 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (No. 10,740)
(CC ED Pa. 1849)).
137. Id. at 1396.
138. General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938).
139. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
140. In referring to H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981), Justice Souter noted
that the increased uniformity of specialized judges handling patent matters would
actually "strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster
technological growth and industrial innovation." Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 20).
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property community with its decision in Hilton. Relieving some of
the compression that Markman had imposed, the case illustrates
the clearest example of the Federal Circuit's expansion of the jury's
role in a case involving the doctrine of equivalents. In Hilton, the
plaintiff, a manufacturer of food and drug impurity-identifying
dyes, secured '746 patent in 1985 which replaced an expensive pu-
rification process with one known as "ultrafiltration." 14 1 The
plaintiff sued Warner-Jenkinson, the defendant, after the defend-
ant began to use commercially an ultrafiltration process 142 very
much like the one secured by the '746 patent. After nine days of
trial, the case was submitted to the jury, which decided that the
patent was valid and the defendant did infringe under the doctrine
of equivalents.' 43 Dissatisfied with the outcome, the defendant
made a post-verdict motion for JMOL, and then appealed when the
trial court did not grant the motion.'4
In the decision from the Federal Circuit, seven judges voted to
affirm the trial court's ruling and five judges voted to overturn it.
In addition to the majority opinion of the Federal Circuit,' 45 this
division prompted one concurring opinion and three separate dis-
senting opinions.' 46 The majority opinion examined the history of
the doctrine of equivalents and concluded that the Supreme Court
provided the useful function/way/result test in Graver Tank, but
that that test is not the end of an equivalents inquiry. 147 The opin-
ion went on to state that after a jury makes a finding of equiva-
141. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515
(1995). Specifically, ultrafiltration involves separating the dye product from vari-
ous impurities that are present by passing the solution through a membrane at a
specified pressure, pH level and pore diameter size. Id.
142. At trial, the plaintiff demonstrated that the '746 patent concerned a pro-
cess which utilized a membrane having a "nominal pore diameter of 5-15 Ang-
stroms under a hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., [and] at a
pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0. .. ."Id. Similar to this, the defendant's process
contained a pore diameter of 5-15 Angstroms, pressure of approximately 200 to 500
p.s.i.g., and a pH of 5.0. Id.
143. Id. at 1516.
144. Id.
145. The majority opinion was delivered per curiam.
146. Circuit Judge Newman, who was the lone dissenter in Markman, filed the
concurring opinion. Circuit Judges Plager, Lourie, and Nies all filed separate dis-
senting opinions in which various other dissenting members joined. Id. at 1529-83.
147. Id. at 1518. The Federal Circuit stated that in addition to the function/
way/result test, the Supreme Court considered all of the evidence relevant to the
"substantiality of the differences" including evidence of copying and evidence of
"designing around" the patent claims. Id. at 1519-20.
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lence, the verdict will be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence, as was the case here.148
Hilton drew a total of three separate dissents from the Federal
Circuit panel deciding the case. 149 The first dissent, written by
Circuit Judge Plager, attacks the very essence of the doctrine of
equivalents claiming that "[any patentee may invoke it as a sec-
ond prong to an infringement suit, in addition to the statutory
cause of action of literal infringement." o50 According to Judge
Plager, application of the doctrine should be for the court, and not
the jury. 151 In addition, Circuit Judge Plager goes on to state that
equivalents cases are largely "pro forma" as a result of most of the
cases reaching the appellate level with only a general verdict and
no explanation by the jury of the rationale behind the verdict, if
any one should exist.152
In Judge Lourie's dissent, he indicates that the trial judge in
Hilton did not follow the correct test for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 53 Specifically, Circuit Judge Lourie indi-
cates that for many years courts have been concentrating on the
function/way/result test to determine infringement under the doc-
trine when this is only a part of the analysis. 15 4 The result, he
feels, has been confusion.' 55
Finally, in his dissent, Circuit Judge Nies states that no in-
fringement can be found in this case as a matter of law if the doc-
trine of equivalents is correctly applied. 5 6 Judge Nies combines
the notion that courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the
scope of its claim with the view that, at most, the doctrine of
equivalents allows for the substitution of an equivalent step within
the boundaries of the invention as marked out by the original
claim.157
The decision in Hilton drew much attention because it fol-
lowed Markman, was decided by the same judges, and sent a con-
148. Id. at 1524.
149. Id. at 1536-83.
150. Id. at 1537 (Plager, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1543.
152. Id. at 1544.
153. Id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1550 (Nies, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1551.
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flicting message as to the jury's proper role in cases involving the
doctrine of equivalents. Reaction from practicing attorneys and
commentators to the Hilton verdict was swift. s5 8 But the conflict
identified in relation to Markman no longer exists since the United
States Supreme Court has stated that claim determination is
purely a question for the court to decide, and this determination
does not infringe upon the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by
jury.159 As Hilton presently stands, the jury is given great power
to do what it does best: match the claim against the evidence
presented at trial. However, the Markman decision has signifi-
cantly reduced the role of juries in patent infringement cases.
Only after a litigant has survived this first crucial step can the
Federal Circuit's decision in Hilton help.
Although the Supreme Court recently assisted in compressing
the role of the jury by its decision in Markman, Hilton now offers
new hope for potential infringements jurors. At present, the intel-
lectual property community stands poised awaiting the decision of
the Court in Hilton which is expected near the end of 1996 or early
in 1997.160 Upon review of Hilton, the Supreme Court decision to
affirm or reverse will determine the role of juries in future patent
infringement cases. If the Court affirms the Federal Circuit, the
jury will maintain its restored power and prominence. Infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents will remain an issue of fact
which must be submitted to a jury for consideration. If, however,
the Court reverses the Federal Circuit, serious questions will arise
as to whether or not a jury is even needed in an infringements
case. Coupling a reversal in Hilton with the Court's earlier
Markman decision will make it seem like the jury's verdict
amounts to nothing more than a "rubber stamp" on a decision
reached by the sitting judge or panel of judges.161
From the language in Markman, however, it appears that the
Court views the Federal Circuit as a 'specialized court' which is
158. See, e.g., Teresa Riordan, Patents: Substantial Questions Linger After A
Ruling That Could Give Patent Holders More Power, N.Y. Times, August 21, 1995,
at D2; Mark Walsh, Federal Court Issues Key Patent Ruling On 'Equivalence,' The
Recorder, August 11, 1995, at 1.
159. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1996).
160. Gary M. Hoffman & John A. Wasleff, A Tale of Two Court Cases: Markman
and Hilton-Davis, 13 The Computer Lawyer, No. 6, June 1996, at 18.
161. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Mayer, J., concurring).
1996] JURY'S ROLE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
well equipped to handle any case that comes before it.162 Since the
Federal Circuit was able to decide both Markman and Hilton
within a period of about four months, there must be an interpreta-
tion which reads these cases as more analogous than dissimilar.
Possibly this interpretation is that due to the complexity of an in-
fringements case, both the judge and the jury should contribute to
the case in the best way that each can. Although not a hardfast
rule, judges deal with complex issues more often than jurors and
are therefore more qualified to determine the precise meaning of
an infringements claim. In contrast, most jurors have no problem
ingesting facts that are presented in a clear and organized manner.
Thus, if every part of the trial is working as it theoretically should,
the litigants will experience an efficient and fair proceeding. As
society becomes more technologically advanced, there may come a
day when most citizens know more about patents than do judges.
If this becomes reality, then the Federal Circuit can side-step the
Markman decision with confidence that an efficient and fair trial
will result. Therefore, since the two cases can be reconciled, it is
highly probable that the Court will defer to the Federal Circuit and
affirm Hilton in its entirety. If the Court does this, jurors will still
be in need of guidance to help them reach verdicts more easily.
PART IV. A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK TO HELP JURORS DECIDE
EQUIVALENTS CASES
Despite this split of authority between the judge and the jury,
neither Markman nor Hilton offer anything to help resolve the two
primary competing policy concerns involving the doctrine of
equivalents. The two basic competing policies of the doctrine of
equivalents are: 1) a battle between the claims described in the
various patents that are issued being clear and well written so that
the public has adequate notice of what the claimed invention is,
contrasted with 2) the patentee losing the benefits of his invention
due to the clever copyist who makes insubstantial changes which
162. In their article, Hoffman and Wasleff note that the Markman "decision...
has rekindled speculation that a movement is afoot to marginalize the role ofjuries
in patent litigation, and perhaps move in the direction of a specialized court sys-
tem." Hoffman & Wasleff, supra note 160, at 18. In the actual case, however, it
appears that Justice Souter would attribute this so-called movement to the Con-
gress and not the Court. See generally Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1936.
113
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effectively takes the infringing invention out of the scope of the
statutorily defined literal infringement.163
Prior to the Hilton decision, many felt that the doctrine of
equivalents was an equitable remedy, and thus not on the same
level as statutory literal infringement. 16 4 However, the decision in
Hilton effectively places the doctrine of equivalents on the same
level as literal infringement; both are issues of fact to be submitted
to the factfinder for a decision. 165 With this new position, the com-
peting policies of the doctrine now have an even more important
impact.
The jury plays a tremendous role in deciding whether or not a
clever copyist has made insubstantial changes to a patented inven-
tion. It is evident that the primary jury function under the doc-
trine of equivalents is to examine the evidence and prevent the
clever copyist from infringing on an established patent. 66 But
questions arise as to how the jury can possibly influence patents so
they are written clearly. In fact, the function of the jury is not trig-
gered merely by the filing of an application for a patent. Likewise,
the granting of a patent will only invoke the jury's expertise when
a lawsuit reaches the courtroom. During this lawsuit, the jury will
use the patent as the standard against which to compare the ac-
cused infringing device. Only through the minor act of comparison
will the jury have any impact on whether a given patent is well
written. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the major influence
the jury will have upon the competing policy concerns will be in
defending the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents by identifying
163. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Peter Blackman, Doctrine of Equivalents: Ruling Unlikely To Resolve Tension In
Patent Law, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 1994, p. 5.
164. One strong voice for this proposition is Federal Circuit Judge Plager who
in dicta is quoted as saying, "Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the excep-
tion, however, not the rule. .. ." London, 946 F.2d at 1538. In a later opinion,
Judge Plager said, "[T]he doctrine of equivalents is not an automatic second prong
to every infringement charge. It is an equitable remedy available only upon a suit-
able showing." 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1954, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also En Banc
Fed. Circuit Will Review Doctrine of Equivalents and Equity, 47 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 133, Dec. 9, 1993.
165. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728).
166. This basically sums up one of the holdings of Hilton. Determining equiva-
lence is an issue of fact to be determined by a jury when it is sitting as fact finder
in an infringement action. Id.
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and preventing the clever copyist from perpetrating a fraud on the
patent.' 67
When a case reaches the jury, the members of the jury are re-
quired to arrive at a decision based on an application of the facts to
the law. Aside from defending the purpose of the doctrine of
equivalents, the jury will have a rather slight effect on the compet-
ing policy concerns. The jury cannot single-handedly define the
boundaries of the doctrine. They can only help to shape it by pro-
viding an example of facts that are sufficient to warrant recovery
under the doctrine of equivalents. Only Congress and the judiciary
have the necessary means to address the competing concerns di-
rectly. The judiciary is, however, restrained by the fact that it can-
not decide issues unless litigants bring disputes.' 68 In contrast,
Congress has the law-making power and thus the ability to effectu-
ate change when it becomes evident that change is warranted and
necessary. 169
Because the two policies tug at opposite ends of the spectrum,
countless courtroom battles that could be avoided are thrust into
the hands of juries with no uniform guidance. And from this, it is
clear that the role of the jury in patent cases involving the doctrine
of equivalents is confused and in transition. Therefore, Congress
should intervene by enacting a statute that results in reduced
litigation.
Congress is in the best position to effectuate this necessary
change in the midst of the present rapid technological revolution.
Despite Congress's sluggishness to pass most laws, any amount of
time spent doing just that would likely be shorter and provide
greater clarity than waiting for the judiciary to make an appropri-
ate ruling. It could be years before the right fact specific scenario
ends up in the courts. In turn, this proposed legislation will help to
make the role of the jury easier in future cases by creating a new
base of evidence to examine.
Judge Newman, in her concurring opinion of Hilton, suggested
that the decision of the court did not answer the difficult question
167. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
168. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).
169. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
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of how to improve lawyers' abilities to predict the outcomes of cases
involving the doctrine of equivalents; nor did it reduce the uncer-
tainty of technological decision making. 170 As a result, Judge
Newman invited "creative thinking" for a statutory procedure
whereby patentees could continue to protect their work after hast-
ily filing for a patent. 171 In response to this challenge, patent laws
from various countries around the world help provide such a statu-
tory framework. 172
Under the current United States statute dealing with amend-
ment of patents, a patent holder has two years in which to enlarge
the scope of the claims of the original patent. 173 Initially, patent
holders are not aware of subtle variations that can be either added
or subtracted from the original patent in order to improve the per-
formance of their device. In the period of just two years, they are
expected to expose all of these and incorporate them into the scope
of the original patent. 74 This generally does not happen. And as a
result, this short time period invites litigation involving the doc-
trine of equivalents in future years.
In order to help curb this wave of litigation, Congress should
amend Chapter 25 of Title 35 to include a new code section enti-
tled, "Certificates of Addition." 75 Within this newly proposed sec-
tion, Congress could allow the patent holder to amend her patent
at any time during the duration of the patent. 76 These certifi-
cates, filed by the patent holder, would put the world on notice of
170. Hilton, 62 F.3d at 1535 (Newman, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 1536. Judge Newman said that "patent law places strong pressure
on filing the patent application early in the development of the technology, often
before the commercial embodiment is developed or all of the boundaries fully ex-
plored." Id.
172. In order to comprise the proposal that follows, the author consulted the
statutes of many nations. The most helpful are from Algeria, Angola, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador and France.
173. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988).
174. Hilton, 62 F.3d at 1536.
175. "Certificates of Addition" is a code section that appears in Angola's Indus-
trial Property Act; Algeria's Ordinance No. 66-54 of March 3, 1966 Relating to In-
ventors' Certificates and Patents for Inventions; Ecuador's Patent Law; and
France's Patent Law.
176. See People's Republic of Angola Industrial Property Act, ch. 2, art. 7
(1992), reprinted in 2B John P. Sinnot, World Patent Law and Practice (1994)
[hereinafter Sinnot]; French Patent Law, ch. X, art. 62 (1968), reprinted in 2D Sin-
not; Algeria's Ordinance No. 66-54 of March 3, 1966, Relating to Inventors' Certifi-
cates and Patents for Inventions, § 3, art. 16-17, reprinted in 2B Sinnot;
Dominican Republic Patent Law No. 4994, art. 12 (1976), reprinted in 2C Sinnot.
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many of the "unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitu-
tions in the patent"177 that develop after the current two year pe-
riod for amendment elapses. Ecuador's Patent Law is the most
clear and concise on this point even though it does not include the
broad unlimited time for amendment. It reads in part:
SECTION V
Certificates of Addition
Art. 33o. - Application may be made for a patent of addition in
respect of an improvement, or modification of an invention for
which a patent is, or has been applied for by the applicant.
This concession, if given, will be granted for the unexpired
term of the main patent.
Art. 34o. - The application and procedure for these certificates
are subjected to the same rules as stated for original
patent. 178
This proposed legislation would greatly limit the number of cases
that arise involving the doctrine of equivalents because patent
holders would have a larger opportunity to fully describe their in-
ventions. Likewise, aspiring inventors would have ample notice of
existing inventions in all their relevant forms. As a result, lawyers
confronted with a case involving similar items would be able to re-
view not only the original patent, but also a file containing numer-
ous Certificates of Addition. All patent holders would be
encouraged to file these certificates whenever they realized a slight
change in the original patent. Should litigation unfortunately
arise, these statutory guidelines would also aid the jury in reach-
ing a just verdict by providing additional evidence. This additional
evidence would provide the jury with all known and filed varia-
tions of the original patent. If the alleged infringing device mir-
rored either the original patent or any of the subsequent
variations, then the jury would find for the plaintiff. In contrast, if
the alleged infringing device in no way resembled the original pat-
177. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
178. Ecuador Patent Law, Patents for Inventions & Exploitation Law, Section
V (1977), reprinted in 2C Sinnot, supra note 176. Section V of Ecuador's Patent
Law also contains Art. 35o. - Art. 39o. (a total of five more provisions) which have
been excluded. Art. 35o. has been excluded in particular because, contrary to the
proposed legislation, it lists a specific time frame in which amendments to a patent
must be made.
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ent or any of the variations on file, then the jury would find for the
defendant. The flexibility of this framework would assure the
jury's significant role in any infringements case.
However, despite its benefits, the proposed statutory frame-
work does have potential problems. First, with more time to
amend the original patent, litigants run the risk of further confus-
ing some jurors. It is likely that patent holders will use this time
to place as many different variations of the invention within the
patent. After the judge dismisses the jury for deliberations, the
voluminous patent (including all its amendments) would be given
to the jury for review. Numerous studies have already shown that
"jurors are very likely to misunderstand the issues raised during a
patent infringement case."179 Additionally, judges are generally
"far better equipped to make accurate findings of fact in compli-
cated cases than are lay juries" due mainly to "greater intelligence
and better training, coupled with the ability to control the pace of
the trial and to study transcripts and relevant documents outside
the courtroom so as to maximize their ability to absorb the rele-
vant facts."18 0 With more facts mixed into an infringements case,
a plaintiff runs the risk of overloading a juror with information. A
likely result of this is an unfavorable rushed judgment which
would not benefit either litigant. But, there are ways to assist ju-
rors in understanding complex issues.' 8 ' By adequately educating
jurors during a trial with the detailed patent and its amendments,
it is likely that they will ultimately be able to reach a fair and im-
partial decision.
179. Jason Scully, Markman and Hilton Davis, The Federal Circuit Strikes an
Awkward Balance: The Roles of the Judge and Jury in Patent Infringement Suits,
18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 631, 645-46 (1996). In this section of his article,
Mr. Scully refers to studies conducted by The Federal Judicial Center and The
American Bar Association.
180. Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 979, 1004 (1987). To help
support this point, Mr. Adelman tells an anecdote of a case where a judge arrived
at his chambers early in the morning in order to read the previous day's transcript.
Id.
181. See Scully, supra note 179, at 648-655. Among the seven listed ways, the
four most practical seem to be: 1) allowing jurors to take notes during trial, 2)
providing jurors with written instructions for deliberation, 3) allowing the use of
neutral experts at trial, and 4) providing jurors with pretrial instructions on what
issues will be discussed during trial. Id.
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Secondly, the proposed statutory framework may place too
much power into the hands of patent holders. With a clear legisla-
tive mandate to amend the original patent freely, patent holders
are likely to file numerous amendments covering each new varia-
tion of their invention. If every potential variation on the original
patent is described either in the original patent or in an amend-
ment, there will be no way the patent holder can lose an
equivalents lawsuit.
The irony is that by allowing so many amendments, Congress
may actually thwart intellectual development. It is possible that
some of the slight changes that are the subject of an amendment
might really be new inventions in their own right. However, this
concern can be cured either at the Patent and Trademark Office or
early on in any ensuing litigation. Control over the issuing of
amendments could be placed with trained experts at the Patent
and Trademark Office who would determine whether or not the
proposed amendment is really an amendment and not a new in-
vention. Within the statute, Congress could also make the deter-
mination of these experts conclusive as to a patent amendment's
validity. Therefore, if an amendment were issued, a current pat-
ent holder and subsequent inventors would not have to await judi-
cial determination.
Even if Congress did not make the amendment issuer's deter-
mination conclusive, the Markman decision will assure a fast reso-
lution of this concern. Markman held that the judge and not the
jury is to determine the meaning of the claim. In making this de-
termination, the judge will need to examine the original patent
and all of its amendments. If the judge feels that one of the
amendments is really not an "amendment" and is instead a new
invention, the defective amendment will be excluded from the
jury's consideration, and more importantly, from their delibera-
tions. Therefore, with no existing patent or amendment mirroring
the accused device, the jury may only conclude that there is no in-
fringement. If the jury returns a verdict of infringement, the judge
may overturn it as a verdict not supported by the evidence.
As jurors and judges become more technologically literate, it is
likely that they will be better able to distinguish between slight
changes in the original patent and new inventions. Thus, despite
its drawbacks, it appears that the proposed statutory framework
will assist jurors and judges alike by either, averting lawsuits alto-
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gether, or providing enough evidence from which modern jurors
and judges can more effectively determine an equivalents case.
With the benefits of this proposal far outweighing the risks in not
pursuing it, Congress should consider this legislation and approve
of it accordingly as a needed change.
CONCLUSION
For well over a century and a half, juries have been interpret-
ing claims under the doctrine of equivalents. This doctrine has
been a potential safeguard for patent holders and an area of bewil-
derment for subsequent inventors. As technology continues to ad-
vance rapidly, better guidance is needed in order to assist juries in
reaching verdicts.
With the creation of the Federal Circuit, Congress initiated a
source of guidance for members of juries in infringement cases.
The problem is that the Federal Circuit has not provided a solid
foundation for jurors to follow due to its often seemingly conflicting
opinions in key cases. In attempting to resolve conflicts involving
the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit has not clearly de-
fined the role of the jury in these highly technical patent infringe-
ment cases. The decision of the Supreme Court in Markman helps
to compress the role of juries in patent litigation by taking an im-
portant issue away from the jury and placing it with the judge.
Although jury instructions are one way in which to offer the
jury guidance on reaching a verdict, this is in essence too little, too
late. Without a clear definition of the jury's role in a case involving
the doctrine of equivalents and without knowing the boundaries of
this doctrine itself, a better course of action is to attempt to avoid
the litigation which invokes it.
Accordingly, this article has provided a statutory framework
which assists patent holders and juries alike. For one, the patent
holder will be able to accurately and effectively describe her inven-
tion as subtle improvements become apparent. This will in effect
put would-be inventors on notice of other devices already in exist-
ence. More importantly, should litigation ensue, juries will have a
wealth of evidence not only on the development of an allegedly in-
fringing device, but also on the patent holder's device. Therefore,
the ability of the jury to make an informed decision is greatly en-
hanced. The result of this enhancement is a more efficient admin-
istration of justice. The doctrine of equivalents is not perfect, but it
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is workable. When the jury's role in an equivalents case is well-
defined, the doctrine of equivalents' workability quotient is
optimized.
Mark B. Watson

